



Cyber security - why and how

Frankfurt, 14 June 2018

ACHEMA

Industrial Cyber Security Program



THE POWER OF CONNECTED

Konstantin Rogalas

Cyber Security Challenges – VoC Feedback





Pressure to increase connectivity of field to center

- + Data-driven management and analytics. IOT, Industrie 4.0
- + Improvement of asset reliability & safety using remote access
- Increases the attack surface



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Cyber Security Requires Proactive Management & Scientific Discipline

OT Cybersecurity Questions...

What's my company's exposure to the latest industrial cyber threat?

Are there "non-sanctioned" devices, like

USBs, that have been added to plant

process control networks?



Are my plants compliant with our corporate cyber security directive?



50% of Board of Directors are not satisfied with Leaderships Cyber Issue Management

What happens if I have a malware outbreak in my control network?

- Production impact?



- Operations staff SOP?
- How quick can I recover?



Agenda



Who is the Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security (H-ICS) Organization?

NIS Directive

USB Protection – SMX Presentation & Demo

ICS Shield Presentation & Demo

Blueprint Methodology – Assessments & Consultancy Services – Automation Security Program Approach

Konstantin Rogalas MSC, MBA

Business Development for Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security - DACH, Central & South-East Europe

- 1989 1998 in Discrete Automation & Process Control;
- 1999 2012 in Telecommunications: Broadband-M2M/IoT;
- 2013 Oil&Gas, Energy, Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals industry Certification study for ENISA in Industrial Cyber Security;
- 2014 2015 ICS Council with policy makers, asset owners and service providers;
- Member of the European ICS Stakeholders Group.
- Contributions: ENISA Reports, ICS3C, EC-JRC ERNCIP "European IACS Components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme" and "Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection(TNCEIP)"



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Cyber Security Specialist for ICS (OT)

220+ Certified Cyber Security Professionals	450+ Security assessments	600+ Remediation Projects
Global team	Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security	Multi Vendor
Cyber Security Standard driven IEC 62443 (ISA 99),	Services Numerous	Cyber Security Products
ANSSI, BSI, CPNI	Partners	450+
embedded or Stand-alone	Cyber labs	Managed Security Networks

Honeywell

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Focus: Up to But Not Including Corporate and 3rd Party Networks



Industrial Cyber Security Solutions Lab

World-Class and Industry Leading Innovation Platform

Flexible model of a complete process control network up to the corporate network

- Industrial Cyber Security solutions development and test
- Training Platform for Industrial Cyber Security Engineers
- Simulation lab for customers
 - Simulate OT cyber attacks; demonstrate cyber security solutions





Solutions Development

Training and Certification

Customer Demonstrations



Honeywell ICS specialists background

- Unique combination of long time experience in process control, networks and cyber security
- Gain knowledge, demonstrate knowledge, and maintain knowledge
 - CISSP CCNA MCSE VCP
 - CISM CCNP MCSA
 - CEH CCIE
 - CRISC CCSP
- Specialists with many backgrounds
 - Honeywell Penetration testing 14+ Languages
 - Yokogawa IT departments
 - Emerson Telecom providers
 - Schneider
 - ABB
 - Siemens
 - ...

Honeywell Provides Full Solutions for Industrial Cybersecurity



- Industrial security program development
- Assessment services
- Architecture and design
- Implementation and systems integration
- Operational service and support
- Compliance audit & reporting





- Whitelisting
- Antivirus
- Next-generation Firewall
- IDS/IPS
- Security Information & Event Management (SIEM)
- Threat Intelligence

MANAGED SECURITY SERVICES



- Secure remote access
- Continuous monitoring and alerting
- Automated patch & antivirus updates
- Incident response & recovery/ back up
- Security device co-management
- Hosting, management and operation of ICS Shield[®]
- OT SOC management & operations

CYBER SECURITY SOFTWARE



- ICS Shield[®] platform for cyber security operations
- Industrial Cybersecurity Risk Manager: Enterprise and Site
- Secure Media Exchange (SMX)
- Advanced Threat Intelligence Exchange (ATIX)
- Industrial assessment software & tools

Comprehensive, Proven and Trusted End-to-End Solutions

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Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive

- 18.12. 2015 Final text was approved by the Member States (MS)
- Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems

DEADLINES	entry into force +	Milestone
August 2016	-	Entry into force
February 2017	6 months	Cooperation Group begins tasks, CSIRTs
August 2017	12 months	Adoption of implementing on security and notification requirements for DSPs
February 2018	18 months	Cooperation Group establishes work programme
May 2018	21 months	Transposition into national law
November 2018	27 months	Member States to identify operators of essential services
May 2019	33 months (i.e. 1 year after transposition)	Commission report assessing the consistency of Member States' identification of operators of essential services
May 2021	57 months (i.e. 3 years after transposition)	Commission review of the functioning of the Directive, with a particular focus on strategic and operational cooperation, as well as the scope in relation to operators of essential services and digital service providers

D – What must KRITIS-Operators comply with?

- 1. Appoint a contact point
 - KritisV Dealine: until 3. Nov 2016 to register at BSI (National Regulator)
- 2. Report Cybersecurity incidents
 - With concrete information flow:
 - 24x7 cybersecurity-org
 - Using appropriate technical controls
 - Within an cyber-aware, mature organization

3. Certify all 730 KRITIS facilities with an Audit by latest May2018:

- that they comply with the "state of the art" norms/standards, such as
 - ISO/IEC 27001/62443



Other EU examples, all must follow

- France: 2 June 2006 identified the sectors of essential services
 - The associated law is
 - http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825&categorieLien=id
 - The associated application decree:
 - http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030405967

Czech Republic:

- 1st January 2015 Czech Cyber Security Act entered into force
- 25th March 2015 Several CII elements were determined
- 26th June 2015 Responsible authorities had to announce contact details
- 25th March 2016 The end of transitional period
- 1st August 2017 Implement NIS Directive Identify operators of the following essential services
- Other countries following: EE, (UK), NL, SE, IT, BE, FI, AT, BG, HU, ES, IE, LV, LT, PL, PO, RO, SK, DK, GR etc.
- Deadline for all EU Member States transposition into national legislation was May 2018 as per initial slide on NIS Directive milestones

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Study: IIoT Challenges



What are the top challenges your company faces in deploying IIoT technology? (N=269, all respondents)

- Cyber Security: most important non-business Element for IIoT-Projects
- ➤Security for IoT CAGR ~35%, 2017-22
 - (Market-Research-Reports.com)

Source: Nov17

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Source: Nov17; 'Putting ICS at the top of the CEO agenda'



Study: How frequent are industrial cyber security attacks?



What were the attack sources?



Source: Nov17; 'Putting ICS at the top of the CEO agenda'



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Industrial USB Attacks are Increasing – Operation Copperfield

How this attack happened:

Another example of the need for SMX...the attack known as Operation Copperfield was caused by an operator watching a movie loaded from a USB during his shift

On December 11, 2017 at 01:21 a.m., a night-shift employee working at a critical infrastructure facility in the Middle East inserted a USB drive into a shared workstation that dozens of employees use on a daily basis," said researchers at Nyotron.

"The employee was watching the movie La La Land that he had recently downloaded to his USB."

The employee did not realize that simple actions of inserting the USB drive initiated a sequence of events that had the potential to be disastrous for his organization.

"Along with the movie, he had launched a well-crafted attack now known as Operation Copperfield"

Other Industrial Examples:



Major Gas Company Hit by Virus Infection:

Office systems were unusable since the malware struck. Virus entered the systems via USB flash drive.



U.S. Electric Utility Virus Infection:

Virus infection discovered in a turbine control system at the power plant. A third-party technician used a USB drive that was infected with a variant of the Mariposa virus.



Steel Plant Infected with Conficker:

An investigation revealed Conficker virus infection in all machines of the ALSPA system. One possibility regarding how this virus spreads is through a USB drive as well as via network.



Source: http://www.isssource.com/ics-alert-usb-malware-attack/

U.S. Power Plant Hit by USB-Based Malware:

Attacked through an infected USB stick used for software updates. Infected with two common malware & one with sophisticated malware



SMX Now Protects Against Advanced USB Threats

- Manipulation of USB firmware.
- BadUSB

Bash

Bunny

• USB device will act as – HID (Human Interface Device, like a keyboard) and can execute scripts.

- A keystroke injection tool disguised as generic flash drive.
- Computer recognizes the USB as a typical keyboard and automatically executes the preprogrammed rubber ducky scripts.
- Execution speed around 1000 words per minute.

Ability to execute all Rubber ducky scripts, as well as more complex attacks:

Ethernet over USB via RNDIS (Remote Network Driver Interface Specification) or Ethernet control model (ECM)

Rubber

Ducky

- Mass Storage Device
- A serial device
- Fully featured Linux computer

SMX Provides Protection from Attacks Others in the Industry Cannot

Unique Features

Value-For-Money





Why choose Honeywell's SMX?

Are your policies really enforced?

- Can USB scanning be bypassed?
- Can files be added/modified after initial check?

Traditional weak USB Protection security controls

- AV / Competing solutions only scan files for threats, not the USB device itself
- Will they catch malware that exists at root or firmware level on device?
- Can they protect against the latest threats like BadUSB or Rubber Ducky bypass attacks?

Traditional High life-cycle cost and effort because

- Competing solutions can require manual effort to update malware signatures
- Do you have the time and resources in place to keep things up to date? ... or to add newer, more advanced detection solutions?

Is it really up-to-date?

- AV/Others are in practice updated every month, week or at best daily.
- Timely delays to the latest cyber threats <u>create a serious security</u> vulnerability.

Process Control Network

Competing solutions may link to PCN, increasing attack surface!

Honeywell's SMX:

Enforces policies

- USB drive cannot be accessed unless checked-in
- SMX provides tamper resistance & digitally signs clean files

Strongest security controls

- SMX guards against new attacks where competing products are still vulnerable (e.g. <u>BadUSB</u> or <u>Rubber Ducky</u> bypass attacks)
- SMX uses Reputation & File-Code analysis in addition to AV by continuous feed from multiple detection engines/vendors.

Lower life-cycle cost and less effort to maintain

- SMX is a fully managed solution requiring no manual administration
- Cost savings through labor efficiencies and built-in threat detection offset cost of ownership

Auto-learning protection

Advanced Threat

(ATIX)

Intelligence Exchange

- Honeywell's threat repository (ATIX) grows continuously as threats are identified globally
- Threat intelligence sources include Industrial and PCN updates, much more than off the shelf anti-virus scanning

SMX sits outside PCN so there is zero threat

Process Control Network

SMX Connection to ATIX Ensures Evergreen Cyber Threat Protection

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2018 ENGINEERS' CHOICE AWARDS

WINNER

- Honeywell's Secure Media Exchange (SMX) has been named a Control Engineering's 2018 Engineers' Choice Awards winner
- The coveted Control Engineering Engineers' Choice Awards highlight some of the best new control, instrumentation and automation products as chosen by Control Engineering's print and online subscribers



SMX Won an Award from Control Engineering China Earlier in 2017

Recent Examples of SMX Customers



Growing Customer Base Strengthens ATIX's Cyber Threat Intelligence

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Grassroots-level OT Cyber Security Issues

Partial coverage of security essentials

- Multiple access points
- Partial data on assets & events
- No proper hardening
- No proper monitoring
- No proper governance
- No proper planning & accountability

Remote employees, control system vendors, 3rd party vendors, contractors





IIoT Security Management Challenge

Secure transfer of data to HQ or cloud

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- IIoT devices (such as sensors) will generate huge amount of data
- Advanced analytics are needed to turn this data into strategic wisdom
- Analytics capabilities will be at HQ or cloud based
- Modern plants will require secure data transfer tunnel to cloud or HQ



Requires massive data transfer outside of the ICS network

Honeywell ICS Shield

Top-down OT security management

- Automates top-down integrated approach for deployment and enforcement of plant-wide security policies
- Based on proven technology acquired through Nextnine acquisition – over 6000 installs
- Delivers unrivaled visibility, reliability and compliance for industrial plant operations
- Enables security of remote field assets from a single operations center



Key Features:

- Secure remote access
- Secure file transfer
- Automated patch and AV updates
- Asset discovery
- Performance/health monitoring
- Compliance reporting



Industry Standard Platform for Secure Remote Access – 6000+ Installs

ICS Shield: OT Security Management Platform



ICS Shield Deployment

Distributed architecture and secure tunnel from plants to center

- Install SC at the data center
- Install VSEs at each plant
- Establish a secure tunnel, outbound, using port 443, TLS encrypted
- One FW rule to manage all remote connections





ICS Shield System Architecture





Discover – The Starting Point For A Secure ICS

End-to-end visibility into the ICS

- Passive and Active discovery
- Discovery down to L3, L2 and even L1
- Configuration collection
- Change monitoring
- Classification & labeling
- Visualization
- Assets labeling

NIST Cybersecurity Framework ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried.





Connect – Expert To Asset, Fast And Secured

Improving assets reliability & safety AAA Remote Access control

- Centralized authentication
- Granular privilege
- Accountability with full audit
- Real-time supervision and session termination
- Vault
- Files & Data transfer

Access Control (AC): Access to assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized activities and transactions.





Protect – Automate Plant-wide Security Policy

Minimize manual effort and human mistakes

Improve security and compliance by standardizing on plantwide policy

Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP): Security policies, processes, and procedures are maintained and used to manage protection of information systems and assets.





Plant Hardening Compliance Report



Compliance Dashboard





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Industrial Cyber Security – A Custom Approach !



- IT Security is all about CIA triad.
- Failures result into Information Disclosure, Loss of Money, Intellectual Properties, Denial of access to Services,.....etc.
- IT Systems are dynamic, continuously adopting newer and more secure cyber infrastructure
- Critical assets are concentrated in the network core (Server Farms)



- OT Security is concerned with Reliable and Safe operation of the Industrial Control Systems
- OT Cyber failures can result in Injury, Loss of Life, Loss of Property, Damaged Production, Damaged Equipment, Environmental Crisis, and Denial of access to Critical Infrastructure
- OT still uses legacy unsecured open protocols
- OT critical assets are distributed in the field (Logic Solvers – Control/Safety)



CYBER SECURITY PROGRAM ELEMENTS, FOUNDATIONS, AND LIFE CYCLE



FOUNDATIONS

1- Identification

2-Protection

3- Detection

4- Response

5- Recovery

CYBER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS - IDENTIFICATION

• The goal of the Identification is to identify the proper **TARGET PROTECTION PROFILE**





CYBER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS - IDENTIFICATION

• The **TARGET PROTECTION PROFILE** can be reached through the study of **RISK**, and through **Regulations**



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IEC 62443 SECURITY LEVELS



C2M2 Maturity Indicator Levels

C2M2 Practices have been further institutionalized and are now being managed. Policies exist, the organization is fully risk aware and MIL3 periodic audits and reviews of all activities are in place to improve and anticipate on new threats. Practices are no longer performed irregular or ad hoc, performance of MIL2 the practices is sustained over time and are well documented. Overall performance is measured and documented. Initial formal practices exist but may be performed in an ad hoc MIL1 manner, however they must be performed. MILO No formal practices exist



PROTECTION PROFILE



Control Effectiveness = Design Effectiveness x Operations Effectiveness



TYPICAL PROTECTION PROFILE PER INDUSTRY

Code	Market	SL1	SL2	SL3	SL4	MILO	MIL1	MIL2	MIL3
1001	Refining process facilities								
1102	O&G LNG terminals								
1103	O&G processing								
1104	O&G production – on-shore								
1105	O&G production – off-shore								
1108	O&G Marina – LNG IAS								
1110	Gas To Liquid								
1112	Production – Coal bed M								
1114	Pipeline – Liquid								
1115	Pipeline – Gas								
1201	Pulp								
1202	Paper								
1203	CWS								
1303	Utility Power								
1401	Fertilizers								
1403	Petrochemicals								
1404	Plastics and fibers								
1405	Specialty Chemicals								
1406	Biofuels								
1501	Alumina								
1502	Aluminum								
1503	Base materials								
1504	Cement								
1505	Coal & Coal Gasification								
1506	Iron								
1509	Precious metals								
1510	Steel making								
1508	Other								



IAC														·												
SR	1	.1	1.2	1.3	1.4		1.	5		1.	.6	1.	.7	1.8			1	.9			1.10	1.11	1.	12	1.	13
Capability	C1	C2	C5	C7	С9	C10	C11	C12	C13	C15	C16	C17	C18	C21	C22	C23	C24	C25	C26	C27	C29	C30	C31	C32	C33	C34
UC																										
SR		2.1		2.2		2.3			2.4		2.5	2.6					2.8					2.9	2.9	2.10	2.10	2.11
Capability	C35	C36	C37	C40	C42	C43	C44	C47	C48	C49	C51	C52	C54	C55	C56	C57	C58	C59	C60	C61	C62	C65	C66	C68	C69	C70
SI																										
SR	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.9															
Capability	C75	C77	C78	C79	C81	C84	C86	C87	C88	C89	C93															
DC																										
SR	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.3																						
Capability	C95	C96	C98	C100																						
RDF																		S	5L2							
SR	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4																			
Capability	C101	C102	C103	C106	C107	C110	C112								R	eai	uir	ed	Cai	bak	bilit	ties	:			
TRE																										
SR	6.1	6.2																								
Capability	C113	C115																								
RA																										
SR	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.8																
Capability	C116	C117	C119	C120	C121	C123	C124	C125	C127	C128																



- 1. Architectural Design Requirements
 - Layered Network Architecture
 - Level 1.0 Real Time Control Network
 - Level 2.0 Supervisory Control Network
 - Level 2.5 Peer to Peer Supervisory control, and 3rd Party Supervisory control
 - Level 3.0 Advanced Control, and Infrastructure Management Network
 - Level 3.5 DMZ Network

- 2. Technical Security Controls
 - Use of Active Directory with Honeywell High Security Policy
 - Malicious Code Protection Mechanism:
 - 1) Network based Firewalls
 - Level 1.0 to Level 2.0 boundary
 - Level 3.0 to Level 3.5 boundary
 - Level 3.5 to Level 4.0 boundary
 - 2) Intrusion Detection System at Level 2.5 to Level 3.0 boundary
 - 3) Access Control Lists at Level 2.5 to Level 3.0 boundary
 - 4) Host Based Firewalls
 - 5) Managed Antivirus deployment with continuous updates
 - 6) Patch Management Process / Mechanism
 - Use of portable storage media protection mechanism
 - Managed Backup and Recovery Mechanism
 - Hardening of Network nodes and Networking Protocols
 - Hardening of End Nodes



- 3. Cyber Security Situational Awareness
 - Capability to continuously monitor all security mechanisms performance!
 - Honeywell Risk Manager:
 - > Network Security (Detection of un authorized devices, un-shut interfaces,...etc)
 - > End Node Security Monitoring (AV, Security Logs, Etc)
 - Patch Management Monitoring
 - Backup and Recovery



HONEYWELL SL 2 SOLUTIONS

Solutions for Mandatory Controls

- 1. Honeywell High Security Domain Policies
- 2. PaloAlto DMZ Firewall
- 3. McAfee IPS
- 4. McAfee ePO and Virus Scan Enterprise
- 5. Honeywell Secure Media Exchange (SMX)
- 6. Experion Backup and Recovery
- 7. Honeywell Risk Manager

Solutions for Optional Controls (Manage)

- 1. Honeywell Remote Managed Services:
 - a. Secure Connect
 - b. Antivirus Updates
 - c. OS Patch Updates





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SR	1	l.1		1.	2	1	.3	1.4			1.5			1.	6		1.7		1.8			1.9				1.10	1.11	1.:	12	1.1	L 3				
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UC																																			
SR		2.1			2.	2		2.	.3				2.4			2.5	2.6	2.7					2.8	3						2.9		2.10		2.11	2.12
Cabability	C35 C	36	C37	C38	C40	C41	C42	C43	C44	C45	C46	C47	C48	C49	C50	C51	C52	C53	C54	C55 C	56 C	57 C58	B C59	9 C60	C61	C62	C63	C64	C65	C66	C67	C68 C	69 C7	0 C71	. C73
SI																																			
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Cabability	C75 C	76	C77	C78	C79	C80	C81	C82	C84	C85	C86	C87	C88	C89	C90	C91	C93																		
DC																																			
SR	4.1		4.2	2	4.3																														
Cabability	C95 C	96	C98	C99	C100																					_	_								
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Cabability	C113 C	114 (0115																																
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Cabability	C116 C	117 (C118	C119	C120	C121	C122	C123	C124	C125	C126	C127	C128				_																		

SL3 requiems include all applicable SL2 requirements in addition to all SL3 Requirements Enhancements.

- 1. Architectural Design Requirements
 - Additional Segmentation requirements:
 - 1) Use of security zones rather than functional network levels leading to a network level being segmented into multiple security zones and sub-zones
 - 2) Physical Segmentation of Process Controllers and Safety Controllers security zones
 - 3) Physical Segmentation of Critical and Not Critical control security zones
 - 4) Logical/Physical segmentation of Level 3 Automation, Infrastructure Management and Security Management security zones
 - 5) Logical/Physical segmentation of the DMZ Interfacing, Infrastructure Management, and Security Management security zones



- 2. Technical Security Controls
 - Additional Malicious Code Protection Mechanisms:
 - 1) Next Generation Firewalls
 - Level 1.0 to Level 2.0 boundary
 - Level 2.5 to Level 3.0 boundary
 - Level 3.0 to Level 3.5 boundary
 - Level 3.5 to Level 4.0 boundary
 - 2) Intrusion Prevention System
 - Level 2.5 to Level 3.0 boundary
 - Level 3.0 to Level 3.5 boundary
 - 3) Application Whitelisting
 - Network Configuration Management
 - Performance Monitoring
 - Log Management and Storage (SIEM)
 - Security Events and Incidents Management (SIEM)
 - Two Factor Authentication for Remote Access
 - Active Directory Segregation



- 3. Cyber Security Situational Awareness
 - Capability to continuously monitor all security mechanisms performance!
 - Honeywell Risk Manager:
 - > Network Security (Detection of un authorized devices, un-shut interfaces,...etc)
 - End Node Security Monitoring (AV, Security Logs, Etc)
 - Patch Management Monitoring
 - Backup and Recovery
 - Periodic SL3 Security Auditing for Design and Implementation



H-ICS Services & Assessments



Sample Automation Security Roadmap



Cybersecurity Roadmap Budget Breakdown



Sample Tasks Framework

Identify	 Automated asset discerning inventory (TRACE, Risterning) Assessment Services 	overy and sk Manager)	 Real-time multisite and Enterprise Ris MSS/ICS Shield 	e Risk Score (Risk Manager sk Manager)
Protect	 Automated patch + AN SMX for Media ATIX 	/I delivery	 MSS/ICS Shield ICS Shield for SO Endpoint Protection Secure remote accession 	C on (AV, AWL) cess & data transfer
Detect	 Honeywell RM SMX Honeywell ERM SIEM Honeywell ATIX 	 Monitor al log collect Scan port whitelists/ 	nd tion s & services against ⁄blacklists	 Compliance reporting Risk based Reporting
Respond	 Consultancy services Honeywell ICS Shield Hosted SOC remotely 	for Policies an or in Custome	d procedures er head office	
Recover	 Multi-site file transfer i EBR Disaster Recovery Pro 	nfrastructure f ogram	or backup/restore	

SECURE YOUR ENTERPRISE AT ALL STEP-LEVELS CONTINUOUSLY



Manageability requires a S.M.A.R.T. and holistic approach



Manageability requires a S.M.A.R.T. and holistic approach

Takeaway Recommendations To Keep Secure





Honeywell is building a smarter, safer, and more sustainable world

THAT'S THE POWER OF **CONNECTED** THAT'S THE POWER OF **HONEYWELL**

Connected Aircraft • Connected Automobile • Connected Home • Connected Building Connected Plant • Connected Supply Chain • Connected Worker



Honeywell Recommendations & Statements

- Information about Vulnerabilities / Malware / Ransomware you can find under: https://www.honeywellprocess.com/en-US/support/Pages/security-updates.aspx
- On Spectre & Meltdown TRITON:
 - Application Whitelisting (AWL): provides best protection
 - Only the allowed "whitelisted" Applications can execute
 - Potential Malware, which could exploit the vulnerabilities, are excluded in the first place.
 - MSS/HSSN Performance Report now includes "Current Treat Status" for each monitored device

Honeywell Systems Sta	atus Rep	Ort Cincinally - Site 13 Oct - 30 Oc											
Dashboard > Systems Security >	Current T	hreats Status >											
CCN1PDC0102 - 3rd Party Serve	er		Davisa	Madel	mpliance	pdates						Restore	
		Current Threats Status	Device	model	s S S	U noi			status	Statu	1	o and	
		This view shows all known vulnerabilities that may represent a threat to this device.			oftwa	efinit	rrors	cuel.	ounts	reats	itches	ackup	ę
	Threat	Description Status			rirus S	rirus D	rirus E	ogin status	states	ent Th	rity Pa	rion B	be Rea
	1	Type: PROCESSOR DESIGN FLAW Both attacks take advantage of the fact that processors execute instructions speculatively. Seculative execution can load data into cache even if it turns out that the data should never have been loaded there in the first place.			Antiv	Antiv	Antiv	USB	Gues	Curr	Secu	Expe	Adot
	Spectre	Remediation. Windows patching, CPU stimuter update Impact: Any kernel imemory can be read by user programs. (example: a malcious JavaScript in a browser could steal passwords stored in the browser, Hypervisor escape).	CCN1ESC0105	ES-C	0	8	0 0) 0	0	8	0	0	0
		Affected or monos al versions; Intel, Linux - all versions; IOS - all Affected OS: Whonos - all versions; IOS - all	CCN1ESC0106	ES-C	0	8	0 0) 0	0 (8	06) 0	0
		Typer PROCESSOR DESIGN FLAW	CCN1ESC0107	ES-C	0	8	00) 0	0 (0	0 6	0	0
	10000	Both attacks take advantage of the fact that processors execute instructions speculatively. Speculative execution can load data initial cache event if thans out that the data should never have been loaded there in the first place.	CCN1ESC0108	ES-C	0	8	0 0) 0) 0	8	06	0	0
	Metdown	Remeasion: werooks patching: CPU similare update: Impact: Any kennel memory cate to ace by user programs. (example: a malicious JavaScript in a browser could steal passwords stored in the browser; Hypervisor escape).	CCN1ESC0109	ES-C	0	8	0 0	0	0	0	0 6	0	0
		Arketed Governor, and version, Ender Arbon (driving) and Arbon (driving) arbon (driving) and Arbon (driving) a	CCN1ECT0101	ES-CE	O	8	00) 0	0	0	0 6) 📀	0
		Type: RANSOMWARE	CCN1ECT0102	ES-CE	0	8	00) 0	0	0	0 6	0	0
	NotPetya	Notifying makawas is a setterpropaging ransominate that spreads through internal networks and over the public internet by exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft's SMIB protocol. It looks for other user credential on the Walkwrable	CCN1ECT0103	ES-CE	0	8	0 0) 0) 0	0	0 6) 0	0
		Nemedation vivolovis pakoring Impact. Loss of Jack for affected devices.	CCN1EST0101	ES-T	0	8	00) 0) 0	0	0 6	0	0
		Type RANSOMVARE	CCN1EST0102	ES-T	0	8	00) 0) 0	0	0 6) 0	0
	WannaCry	Wannaby' makate is a self-propagating worm-like random water that spreads through internal networks and over the public internet by exploding a vulnerability in Microsoft's Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. The makare use sencyted of to channels for commission and end ortifol (C) communications:	CCN1EST0103	ES-T	0	8	0 0	0	0	0	0 6	0	0
		Remediator. Windows patching Impact. Loss of Nuclionality and data for affected devices.	CCN1EST0104	ES-T	0	8	0 0) 0) 0	0	0 6) 📀	0
			CCN1EST0105	ES-T	0	8	0 0	0) 0	0	0 6	0	0
		Key Observations: The device is not protected against vulnerabilities which are actively exploited by known major threats.	CCN1EST0106	ES-T	0	8	0 0) 0	0	8		0	0
		Recommendations: Consider installing the latest security patches.	CCN1EST0107	ES-T	0	8	0 0) 0	0	8			0
		Topological and the second secon	CCN1EST0108	ES-T	0	8	0 0	0	10	8			
													no

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